Federal Reserve : The CRA and the subprime crisis by Renee Courtois Haltom
F
or more than 30 years, the Fed
and the other bank regulators
have been responsible for 
evaluating the extent to which banks
meet the lending needs of their 
communities. The Community Rein-
vestment Act, or CRA, sets this 
obligation, and regulators can hold up
the expansion plans of banks that fail
to perform well, so there is strong
incentive for them to comply. Since
the CRA may push banks into what
are perceived to be riskier lending
areas, onlookers ranging from think-
tank analysts to policymakers have
wondered whether it played a large
role in fueling the subprime lending
boom and bust. Some critics even say
the crisis is proof that the CRA
should be abolished, while others
argue it played at most a small part in
the housing boom and bust of the
past decade.
The CRA was originally designed
to attack the urban decay that took off
after World War II. Policymakers
viewed the deterioration of urban
cores as partly the result of 
constrained credit to resident home-
owners and businesses. Sometimes
this was the result of explicit discrimi-
nation through “redlining,” which
most CRA historians trace back to a
1930s effort by the federal Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC), a
New Deal-era organization created to
prop the real estate industry. 
The HOLC was asked to assess real
estate lending risks of 239 U.S. cities.
Officials drew color-coded maps 
based on perceived risks and assigned
the color red to the riskiest areas,
defined in part as having a high 
concentration of African-Americans.
Although the government retreated
from explicitly racial policies after a
Supreme Court decision in the late
1940s striking down racial deed
covenants, banks mimicked the 
practice and continued to profile
neighborhoods into the 1970s. They
applied stricter lending terms to the
(typically) minority borrowers within
those neighborhoods, or refused to
lend at all.
Discrimination wasn’t the only
cause of constrained credit; market
frictions also existed. Borrower risk
was harder to assess in the late 1970s
when the Act was created, particularly
in unpioneered markets. Relatively
fewer home sales in underserved areas
made real estate appraisals difficult.
By the same token, borrowers in
lower-income markets tend to have
sparser credit history from which to
assess risk. The first bank to enter an
underserved market had significant
work to do to investigate the risks and
prospects of borrowers, but once the
inroads were made, information
proved difficult to keep proprietary.
This led to the “first mover” problem
in which no bank had sufficient incen-
tive to extend loans or even establish a
branch in underserved areas.
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didn’t cause it, 
but there are still 
opportunities 
for improvement
The Community Reinvestment Act was created to prohibit redlining, shown in 
this Philadelphia area map. Banks literally drew a line around certain 
low-income, often ethnic, neighborhoods and placed limits on lending to them.
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loans that they presumably would not have otherwise. This
was rationalized by the government support banks receive
through deposit insurance and access to the Fed’s discount
window. Government and ultimately taxpayer support
seemed to imply an obligation to meet the credit needs of
entire communities, not just the safest lending risks. 
The CRAalso fit the spirit of the day. Lawmakers passed
the CRAin 1977 amidst a chain of similar laws aimed toward
strengthening access to credit services for poorer popula-
tions and minorities. Those included the Fair Housing Act of
1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, both of
which focused explicitly on racial discrimination. The CRA’s
main provisions omit mention of race, instead focusing
more broadly on low-to-moderate (LMI) income communi-
ties. The Act states that financial institutions have an
“affirmative obligation” to meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered. In practice, banks
are rated on three categories of activity — lending to bor-
rowers in LMI communities, investment in community
development, and financial services, ranging from the avail-
ability of ATMs to financial education — and how that
activity is distributed across neighborhoods and borrowers
of different income thresholds. The weights applied to each
of those categories vary by bank asset size, but lending —
consumer, homeowner, small-business loans, among other
types of credit — is weighted highest. 
There are no explicit lending quotas under the CRA, but
regulators can hold up the merger or expansion plans of a
bank that fails to achieve a passing rating of “Satisfactory” or
“Outstanding.” CRA ratings began to be published in 1989,
and advocacy groups began to use the newly available data to
protest the plans of banks that did not perform well on CRA
exams through the public comment process and merger
hearings. This intensified the imperative to perform well on
CRA exams, especially after restrictions on interstate
branching were lifted in the mid-1990s and bank merger
applications surged. Banks responded by ramping up their
CRAprograms. 
The CRA’s passage in 1977 was not without controversy.
Opponents voiced arguments that aren’t much different
from those of the CRA’s critics today: It would distort mar-
kets, unduly burden financial institutions, and encourage, 
if not mandate, unsound lending. The latter argument has
escalated following the subprime mortgage lending boom
and bust. Many economists, both supporters and opponents
of the CRA, argue that it did not play a large role in the 
crisis. At the same time, most regulators and community
development practitioners agree that its current form is
somewhat outdated in the modern financial system.
Does the CRALead to Unsound Lending? 
The role of the banking system is to allocate credit to its
most productive uses. The modern banking system is gener-
ally based on the premise that banks can accomplish this
goal most efficiently if they are able to make loans which are
most profitable to them within the bounds of safety and
soundness regulations. Accordingly, the 1977 CRA language
emphasized that all CRA-related loans should comply with
normal safety and soundness standards. Rather than induc-
ing banks to extend unduly risky loans, the CRA was
couched as a way to force banks to look harder to identify
profitable lending opportunities in LMI areas that they oth-
erwise might have avoided. If constrained credit was the
result of discrimination and market frictions — as opposed
to heightened credit risk in LMI areas — then in theory the
CRA could increase LMI lending without sacrificing safety
or profitability.
Most studies have found that the CRAhad a net positive
effect on lending to LMI communities, though some mixed
results have stemmed from the difficulty of controlling for
the myriad other factors that affect lending. For instance,
lending to LMI populations has certainly increased faster
than higher income lending, but this could also reflect coin-
cident factors such as fair lending laws and a stronger
cultural norm against discrimination. 
A 2003 study by economists Robert Avery, Paul Calem,
and Glenn Canner of the Federal Reserve Board looked at
census tracts, or geographic areas, just above and just below
the LMI threshold of 80 percent of median family income.
At the 1990 census, tracts just below the threshold had lower
homeownership and higher vacancy rates than households
just above the threshold. By 2000 there was very little differ-
ence between them. The CRA would have focused on
households just below the threshold, so the authors con-
clude that at least part of the improvement in LMI
households most likely resulted from the CRA. 
It is also likely that the CRAresulted in loosened lending
standards in some cases. Critics point to at least one signifi-
cant change that may have had this effect. The original CRA
framework consisted of 12 criteria that granted banks credit
for attempts to locate LMI lending opportunities. Critics
and advocacy groups argued that banks could skirt the
CRA’s intent by showing they had investigated loan oppor-
tunities without actually making loans. In general,
practitioners also thought CRA procedures were too vague
to be applied consistently. In 1995, CRA regulations were
revised with a focus on measurable lending outcomes, and
part of the current assessment criteria includes the extent to
which banks use “innovative or flexible” lending practices to
extend loans. This specificity made CRA examination and
compliance much less costly, and, as the Avery, Calem and
Canner study shows, LMI lending increased in the same
time period.
But the change came with an unintended side effect,
according to former Fed governor Lawrence Lindsey, who
oversaw CRA regulation during his tenure. Eventually LMI
markets became better served, but the new “soft quotas” did
not change. “In fact, it would be a real CRA black eye for a
bank to reduce the number of loans it was making in a par-
ticular area,” Lindsey wrote in a 2009 manuscript on the
CRA published jointly by the Boston and San Francisco
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already received loans, a somewhat less creditworthy group
had to take their place. As time went on, lending standards
had to be relaxed to avoid any ‘backsliding’ on an institu-
tion’s CRAobligations.” 
But the 1995 changes came more than a decade before
most of the financial crisis seeds were sown. There have
been no substantive changes to CRA regulations since the
mid-1990s to cause a major change in LMI lending trends,
yet the subprime crisis is rooted mainly in mortgages
extended between 2004 and 2007.  That implies other 
factors caused the more recent boom in subprime lending
and deterioration of lending standards. One probable factor
is that it became increasingly profitable for all types of mort-
gage lenders, even those not subject to the CRA, to sell
mortgages on the secondary market during the recent boom.
After good credit risks were met, it appears lenders may
have lowered lending standards in order to continue partici-
pating in this booming and profitable market.
Data, too, suggest institutions covered by the CRAwere
not a large enough part of the subprime market to con-
tribute significantly to the crisis. A 2008 Federal Reserve
Board of Governors study analyzed 2006 data made public
through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
During the 2005-2006 peak in subprime lending, half the
volume of higher-priced mortgages, which researchers often
interpret to reflect subprime borrowers, was originated by
nonbank mortgage companies not covered by the CRA.
Only 6 percent of all higher-priced loans in 2006 were made
by CRA-covered institutions or affiliates to LMI borrowers
or neighborhoods in their CRA assessment areas, the
researchers found. 
Those loans performed better than loans made by non-
banks, research suggests. A study of California data during
the boom by San Francisco Fed researchers Elizabeth
Laderman and Carolina Reid found that mortgages ex-
tended in a lender’s CRAassessment area were significantly
less likely to be in foreclosure than those extended by inde-
pendent mortgage companies not subject to
the CRA, after controlling for borrower, 
loan, and neighborhood characteristics.
Interestingly, the performance of loans
made by CRA lenders relative to non-CRA
lenders — a statistical output called an odds
ratio — is actually better within banks’
assessment areas than outside of them. This
may reflect that loans in CRA assessment
areas face an additional level of scrutiny by
regulators through CRA exams’ on-site
reviews and file checks, the authors suggest.
Slicing the data in a number of ways 
suggests that the CRA does not bear large
responsibility for the subprime crisis, even
if it encourages lower lending standards in
some cases. “There are undoubtedly some
legitimate criticisms of the CRA regula-
tions in this regard, but responsibility for the credit cycle is
much wider and includes the behavior of borrowers and
lenders, regulatory breakdown, and political machinations
of both parties,” Lindsey writes. 
Perhaps more important is that the spirit of the CRA is
reflective of America’s long-standing policy stance in favor
of homeownership. Such policies have spanned decades and
political parties (see chart). The government has insured
mortgages through the Federal Housing Administration,
created a vibrant secondary market for mortgages through
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac — in the early 1990s committing those 
agencies to an affordable housing mandate — and offered a
variety of tax benefits reducing the cost of homeownership.
Most recently, U.S. homeownership took an upward leap
after 1995 when President Clinton adopted the National
Homeownership Strategy, the first comprehensive national
initiative explicitly designed to push homeownership to
record levels. One of the Strategy’s many features was an
explicit commitment to reducing lending standards for 
borrowers who would otherwise not qualify for mortgages.
Homeownership went from around 64 percent, where it 
had more or less hovered for decades, to a peak of about 
69 percent in 2004 and 2005. 
As Lindsey notes, many factors affect homeownership
rather than any one initiative. However, taken together
these policies may have conveyed ongoing government sup-
port of the housing market and reduced the propensity of
lenders, markets, and regulators to question loosened lend-
ing standards and investment in housing. As a result of the
recent fallout, many policymakers, though certainly not all,
now say that the “American Dream” of homeownership is not
the right choice for everyone despite its benefits to many.
Re-asking the Question
There are better-founded criticisms of the CRAthan its role
in the subprime lending crisis. It has become clear that 
the CRA in its current form has not kept up with the fast-
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geographic focus is misplaced in an increasingly boundary-
less electronic banking system. The share of consumer loans
outstanding, for example, that are held by CRA-regulated
commercial banks has declined by 40 percent in the last
three decades (until the financial crisis, when it recovered
some), so the CRA misses a lot of the action. And should
lending continue to receive the majority of the weight on
CRA exams? The subprime crisis proved that more lending
is not always better. Other financial services such as tailored
savings vehicles and consumer education could be a better
way to support LMI communities. 
As academics and regulators consider how to reposition
the CRAto fit today’s financial landscape, many are also ask-
ing again what problem the CRA is intended to solve. Is it
meant to correct market frictions? To supplement antidis-
crimination laws by altering banks’ incentives? To help solve
a social problem? The answers to these questions matter for
whether and how CRA regulations are updated, broadened,
or eliminated. 
There is little doubt that the market frictions that appear
to have constrained LMI lending are lower today than even
15 years ago. That may partially be a testament to the CRA
itself. Banks have become much more skilled at mining prof-
itable lending opportunities in LMI areas. Technological
progress and credit-scoring innovations have made it cheap-
er for banks to assess risks and tailor safe lending products to
borrowers who may otherwise be perceived as too risky to
consider. Many experts believe the CRA initially helped
push banks into lending areas they may have otherwise
ignored, eroding some of the information barriers that pre-
viously existed. More recently, banks have formed creative
partnerships with community organizations in order to
identify profitable development and lending opportunities. 
These inroads have helped dispel the notion that LMI
lending cannot be profitable. A 2000 Board of Governors
study commissioned by Congress surveyed large banks about
their CRA activity. The 143 responding banks — represent-
ing about half the assets of the banking industry at the time
— reported that 77 percent of CRA-related mortgages were
at least marginally profitable, compared to 94 percent of the
portfolio as a whole (including CRA-related mortgages).
To the extent that market barriers are lower today, the
CRAin effect acts as a tool for redistribution. Banks pay an
implicit tax for that redistribution equal to the considerable
compliance costs and any foregone profits from induced
lending. Historically, this has been justified, at least for CRA
supporters, as a quid pro quo in exchange for government and
ultimately taxpayer support of the banking system. (This
argument also is one reason why nonbank lenders are 
currently excluded from the CRA.) The stability that gov-
ernment support buys for the financial system is intended as
a public good, but banks undoubtedly benefit. Economists
asked whether banks adequately pay for this benefit in the
late 1990s when lawmakers were considering the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act, says economist Lawrence J. White 
of New York University’s Stern School of Business.
Government support amounts to a subsidy, argued one side,
while the other pointed out the considerable regulatory 
burden associated with being a bank. 
“Banks are subject to extensive regulation at least partly
because they are special, because they have deposit insurance,
because they have access to the Fed,” White says. “Do banks
benefit from being generally the only provider of financial
services who get to offer this insurance to their customers?
Yes, of course. But there are lots of other costs that are
involved in being a depository institution that sop up much,
if not all, of the gain,” he says.
Even if banks still aren’t judged to be adequately repaying
taxpayers for that service, White says, why not make the 
tax explicit and therefore more efficient? “If that’s the
desire, levy a tax that would go into a CRA fund. Let’s be
clear and transparent, rather than levy the tax through this
vague, opaque process” -- that is, latent redistribution
through the CRA.
One positive outcome of the subprime crisis is that the
discussions casting undue blame on the CRA seem also to
have led policymakers to revisit the law and its possible
flaws, bringing immediacy to the resolution of these 
important issues.  RF
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